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EcO-TERRORIST ACTS DURING THE PERSIAN GULF
WAR: IS INTERNATIONAL LAW SUFFICIENT TO HOLD
IRAQ LIABLE?
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces overtook Kuwait in a "lightning-
like" conquest.' In response to the invasion, the United Nations
marshalled an international coalition which ultimately drove Iraq out
of Kuwait. 2 However, the aftermath of Iraq's occupation of and
retreat from Kuwait was devastating; a 350 square mile oil slick in
the Persian Gulf,3 thousands of dead or dying birds and other wildlife,4
and over 550 burning Kuwaiti oil wells5 were the legacy of Iraq's
occupation. The attempt at wholesale destruction of Kuwait and the
Persian Gulf led several commentators to coin the terms "ecocide"
and "environmental terrorism" to describe Iraq's actions.6 Incredibly,
however, the devastation of Kuwait and the Gulf was foreseeable.
I Walter V. Robinson, Iraq Tightens Its Control Over Kuwait; 'Revolutionary'
Regime Installed; Arab Leaders Withhold Criticism; The Invasion of Kuwait, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 3, 1990, at 1.
2 Bush Halts Offensive Combat; Kuwait Freed; Iraqis Crushed, N.Y. TndEs,
Feb. 28, 1991, at 1; see, e.g., Bob Hepburn, Kuwait's Oil-Fire Nightmare Lifting;
Real Impact of Catastrophe Will Take Months to Judge, TORONTO STAR, July 20,
1991, at A3 (noting the environmental damage Iraq inflicted in retreat); see also
Nick B. Williams, Jr., Middle East Still Suffers from Fallout of Warfare; Legacy:
Rubble Clearing Goes On, and the Historical Impact of Iraq's Defeat Is Not Yet
In View, L.A. Trms, Jan. 17, 1992, at Al (stating ground offensive drove Iraqi
army from Kuwait in only four days).
I See, e.g., Millions of Gallons of Crude Oil Flow into Persian Gulf from
Kuwaiti Tanks, 14 INT'L ENv'T REP. CURRENT REP. (BNA) 37 (Jan. 30, 1991)
[hereinafter Millions of Gallons].
' See, e.g., id.; Robert D. McFadden, War in the Gulf: The Environment; Oil
Threatens Fishing and Water Supply, N.Y. TEs, Jan. 26, 1991, at 1.
I See, e.g., Tom Wicker, In the Nation; Smoke Over Kuwait, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
3, 1991, at 21.
6 See Millions of Gallons, supra note 3, at 37 (Pentagon spokesman calling Gulf
spill "an act of environmental terrorism"); R.W. Apple, Jr., War in the Gulf; U.S.
Says Iraq Pumps Kuwaiti Oil into Gulf, Vast Damage Feared from Growing Slick,
N.Y. Tmms, Jan. 26, 1991, at 1; see also U.S. Trade Mission Pushes Debt-Nature
Swaps, 14 INT'L ENV'T REP. CURRENT REP. (BNA) 13, at 377 (July 3, 1991)
[hereinafter U.S. Trade Mission] (International Green Cross calling Hussein's acts
ecological terrorism); Steven Emerson, When Earth Takes the Hit, 21 INT'L WILDLIFE
38 (1991) (labeling Iraq's actions environmental terrorism).
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As early as September 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had
threatened to destroy Kuwaiti oil wells or "flush" Kuwaiti oil into
the sea if the allies attempted to drive him out of Kuwait.' In mid-
January 1991, Iraqi forces, for unspecified reasons,8 launched their
attack on the environment-deliberately unleashing a flood of oil
into the Persian Gulf.9 Early reports estimated that several million
barrels of oil had spilled into the Gulf by late January, 0 forming
an unchecked spill at least nine miles long." The oil continued to
flow into the Gulf at a rate of more than a million barrels a day. 12
Some of the environmental repercussions from the spill were im-
mediate: cormorants and other birds died by the hundreds; shrimp,
sea turtles, sea cows, dolphins, and plankton were also threatened.
In addition to the immediate wildlife problems, the entire population
of eastern Saudi Arabia, as well as allied forces in the area, was
See Wicker, supra note 5, at 21.
The most commonly asserted reason for the oil release is that Iraq's President,
Saddam Hussein, wanted to prevent an allied invasion of Kuwait. See Millions of
Gallons, supra note 3, at 37; Philip Shenon, U.S. Bombs Kuwait Oil Stations,
Seeking to Cut Flow Into Gulf; More Iraqi Planes Fly to Iran, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
28, 1991, at 1; Apple, supra note 6, at 1. Other possible motives include destruction
of the desalination plants that supplied fresh water to the Saudi people and carrying
through on Hussein's threats to set Kuwaiti oil ablaze or "flush it into the water"
if the allied forces tried to oust him. See Shenon, supra, at 1; Apple, supra note
6, at 1.
9 The oil flowed from two primary sources: the tankers anchored at Mina al-
Ahmadi, south of Kuwait City, and from the Sea Island terminal, an offshore oil
loading dock located near there. Apple, supra note 6, at 1; cf. Saddam's War on
the Gulf's Environment, L.A. Tims, Mar. 5, 1991, at A6 (citing third source of
oil spill at Iraqi oil facility in far northwestern corner of the Gulf).
10 Apple, supra note 6, at 1.
11 McFadden, supra note 4, at 1. By January 30, 1991, experts reported that the
slick contained ten million barrels of oil and covered 350 square miles. Millions of
Gallons, supra note 3, at 37; see also Samia Nakhoul, Kuwait Opens Seminar on
Environmental Damage from Gulf War, Reuters, Nov. 9, 1991, AM Cycle, available
in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File (noting that crude oil destroyed marine life
along Saudi Arabia's Gulf shoreline and part of Iranian coast).
12 Shenon, supra note 8, at 1. The spill was quoted as being thirty times larger
than the Exxon Valdez spill in Prince William Sound which occurred in 1989. Bruce
Nichols, Horrors Plague Wartorn Mideast, NEw ORLEANs Tms PICAYUNE, Dec. 8,
1991, at A36 (lst edition).
"1 Shenon, supra note 8, at 1; see Louis Peck, The Spoils of War, AMcus J.
(Natural Resources Defense Council, New York, N.Y.), Spring 1991, at 6, 7. The
Persian Gulf sea cow, or dugong, is an endangered species and a relative of the
Florida manatee. Id. at 7. According to Mostafa K. Tolba, Executive Director of
the United Nations Environment Program, the spill was "inflicting and [would]
continue to inflict untold damage on the rich biological diversity of the region."
See Millions of Gallons, supra note 3, at 37.
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faced with the possibility of losing their water supply14 as a result
of the spill. 5
In late March, Iraqi troops finished executing Hussein's threat by
setting fire to hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells; 6 approximately six
million barrels of oil, almost ten percent of the world's daily oil
ration, 17 were ignited by retreating Iraqi forces.18 The early assessments
of the damage from the oil well fires were dire: 50,000 tons of sulfur
dioxide (which causes acid rain) as well as 100,000 tons of sooty
smoke were being released into the atmosphere daily.' 9 As a result
of these fires, "daytime temperatures were far below normal, hospitals
were jammed with respiratory patients, [and] 'black rain' [was] dam-
aging crops and water supplies.''20
The damaged wells also spewed oil into the desert creating oil lakes
which were up to four inches deep and more than an acre in size in
some places. 2' These lakes were particularly dangerous to birds mi-
grating from Africa to Europe and Asia 22 because, from the sky, the
'4 See Apple, supra note 6, at 1. The oil slick was flowing from its source toward
the Saudi desalination plants which supplied fresh water to the region. Id.
15 Ironically, however, it has been the Iraqi population which has been most
adversely affected since the close of the war; close to a million Iraqi children are
malnourished and more than 100,000 are starving. Williams, supra note 2, at AIO.
Moreover, due to power shortages which disabled water purification and sewage
plants, most Iraqis are drinking contaminated water. Id.
" See, e.g., Wicker, supra note 5, at 21.
17 Id.
18 Id. Although original estimates placed extinction of all oil well fires at four
to five years, Matthew Nimetz & Gidon M. Caine, Crimes Against Nature, AMcus
J. (Natural Resources Defense Council, New York, N.Y.), Summer 1991, at 8, the
last of the oil well fires was extinguished in early November by an international
team of firefighters. See Williams, supra note 2, at A10.
'9 Wicker, supra note 5, at 21. Other early predictions were that the fires would
cause a "nuclear winter" or a global warming. Id. Some environmentalists now say
that the Kuwaiti oil fires are "unlikely to affect world climate." See Reports Clash
over Extent of Damage Resulting from Oil Fires in Kuwait, INT'L ENV'T REP.
CURRENT REP. (BNA) No. 13, at 369 (July 3, 1991); George Lobsenz, Environ-
mentalists Dispute U.S. Findings on Oil Fires, UPI, June 24, 1991, BC Cycle,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. However, they acknowledge that the
fires will still have a major environmental effect on the Persian Gulf region. Lobsenz,
supra; Nimetz & Caine, supra note 18, at 8.
20 Wicker, supra note 5, at 21; see also Experts Worried by Kuwait Fires, N.Y.
Tnms, Aug. 14, 1991, at A7 (quoting estimate that 50,000 people "will have their
lives shortened in some way" because of smoke from oil fires); Donna Abu-Nasr,
Environmentalists Push for Aid to Restore Kuwait, PHLADELPHUA INQUIRER, Oct.
30, 1991, at G04 (noting that wind-borne pollution caused health hazards and
environmental problems as far away as Pakistan, Turkey, and Bulgaria).
21 Williams, supra note 2, at 1.
" Id. (estimating at least a million migratory birds would die in oil lakes).
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oil resembles water and birds become trapped when they attempt to
land on it. 21
Estimates of the cost of the environmental cleanup average in the
billions of dollars. 24 In addition to the thousands of cleanup offers
received by the Saudi government, 25 individual nations have made
enormous donations to assist the Gulf cleanup. 26 The ecological dam-
age to the region is expected to continue for the next twenty years. 27
23 Nichols, supra note 12, at A36 (quoting concerns of environmental expert).
Although the oil well fires and the oil spills in the Persian Gulf attracted the most
public attention, other environmental horrors remain. The most serious of these
include the more than a million land mines which were buried in the Kuwaiti desert
by Iraqi troops, Williams, supra note 2, at 1, the spent anti-tank missiles which
contain depleted uranium, and the cancer causing PCBs and other hazardous in-
dustrial waste which was "abandoned or strewn by Iraqi vandals and looters." See,
e.g., Nichols, supra note 12, at A36.
1 Major Postwar Clean-up Effort Needed to Avoid Long-Term Gulf Damage,
Group Says, 14 INT'L ENv'T REP. CURRENT REP. (BNA) No. 5, at 132 (Mar. 13,
1991) [hereinafter Major Postwar Clean-up Effort]; Nichols, supra note 12, at A36
(quoting Abdulrahman al-Awadi, chairman of Kuwait's emergency environmental
panel, as saying regionwide cleanup would have multibillion-dollar price tag). Cleanup
efforts thus far have focused on containing the oil slick, collecting the oil, and
putting out the oil well fires. Major Postwar Clean-up Effort, supra, at 132. Much
of the oil collected from the oil lakes is being pumped directly to a refinery for
reprocessing. Nichols, supra note 12, at A36. Efforts are also underway to remove
the mines buried in the Kuwaiti desert. Williams, supra note 2, at A10.
Nevertheless, at least one commentator has criticized the cleanup efforts as being
too narrowly focused on the industrial intakes and desalination plants to the detriment
of "environmentally sensitive" areas. William Arkin & Paul Horseman, Environ-
mental, Military, and Human Effects of the Persian Gulf War One Year Later,
Special News Conference on the Middle-East, Federal News Service, Jan. 10, 1992,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
2 The International Maritime Organization alone spent about $6 million on various
projects to control the oil spill, including cleaning up an island where endangered
turtles and sea birds nest. Nichols, supra note 12, at A36; see also Arkin & Horseman,
supra note 24 (noting that contributions came from only twelve out of the 135
countries who are members of the IMO). In addition, the United Nations Environment
Program raised $2.6 million for the cleanup program. Abu-Nasr, supra note 20, at
G04.
26Major Postwar Clean-up Effort, supra note 24, at 132. For example, Germany
has donated over three million dollars in equipment, the United Kingdom has
contributed over one million pounds, and Japan has donated over one million dollars
for the Gulf cleanup. Id. Kuwait also spent an estimated $1.5 billion to $2 billion
to assist in putting out the oil well fires. Nichols, supra note 12, at A36. The United
States has not made a contribution to the cleanup efforts. Williams, supra note 2,
at A10 (quoting Greenpeace official).
According to the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. See,
e.g., Major Postwar Clean-up Effort, supra note 24, at 132. According to Persian
Gulf officials, some of the problems affecting the cleanup efforts include the enor-




International law on the issue of environmental destruction during
wartime is derived from two primary sources: international environ-
mental law and international warfare law. These two sources of
international law are further divided into conventional law and cus-
tomary law. Conventional law is comprised of agreements, conven-
tions, and treaties voluntarily entered into by a nation, while customary
law is developed through state practice. 21 International law addressing
environmental destruction during wartime is generally regarded as
insufficient to hold nations, such as Iraq, fully accountable. 29 How-
ever, there is another important source of liability: United Nations
Resolution 687.30
A. United Nations Resolution 687
On April 3, 1991, the United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 687 holding Iraq liable under international law for "any
for damage that resulted from its invasion of Kuwait." Nichols, supra note 12, at
A36; see Abu-Nasr, supra note 20, at G04 (environmentalists say main reason for
delay is lack of funding for cleanup). Nevertheless, even if a full scale environmental
cleanup effort was financially feasible, much of the oil would probably have to be
left to degrade naturally because of the fear that the "cleanup [would] do more
damage to the environment" than would the pollution. Nichols, supra note 12, at
A36; see Arkin & Horseman, supra note 24 (noting that despite cleanup efforts,
Gulf will never get "anywhere near" the pre-spill stage).
2 See Richard A. Falk, Environmental Disruption by Military Means and Inter-
national Law in ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE: A TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY AP-
PRAISAL 33, 41-42, (Arthur H. Westing ed., 1984); Maj. Bernard K. Schafer, The
Relationship Between the International Laws of Armed Conflict and Environmental
Protection: The Need to Reevaluate What Types of Conduct are Permissible During
Hostilities, 19 CAL. W. INT'L L. REV. 287, 289 (1989) (distinguishing between the
international law of environmental protection and the international law of armed
conflict).
9 Several commentators have noted that international agreements cover only a
narrow range of environmental issues and that scholars have made numerous efforts
to make environmental laws more meaningful. See Sanford E. Gaines, International
Principles for Transnational Environmental Liability: Can Developments in Municipal
Law Help Break the Impasse? 30 HARv. INT'L L.J. 311, 314 (1989); S. Sumitra,
Bases and Extent of State Responsibility/Liability in International Law for Envi-
ronmental Pollution, 27 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 385, 388 (1987) (noting absence of
binding rules on state responsibility for environmental pollution); see also Falk,
supra note 28, at 33-34 (commenting on states' unwillingness to enter agreements
governing wartime acts); THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & RONALD H. ROSENBERG, EN-
VIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW 1064-65 (1991) (noting that much international environ-
mental law is not binding and lacks effective enforcement mechanisms).
30 SCOR Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 2981st mtg., at 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
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direct loss, [or] damage, including environmental damage and the
depletion of natural resources ... as a result of Iraq's unlawful
invasion and occupation of Kuwait."'" In addition, the Council cre-
ated a fund to collect approximately a quarter of Iraq's annual oil
revenues to pay compensation for claims stemming from Iraq's ac-
tions, while addressing the humanitarian problems abounding in Iraq. 2
In order to implement Resolution 687 and alleviate the hunger and
suffering of the Iraqi people, the United Nations Security Council
engaged in a flurry of legislation making activity. First, Resolution
688, enacted by the Security Council on April 5, 1991, appealed to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations to use "all the resources
at his disposal" to address humanitarian concerns in Iraq.33 The
Security Council followed that Resolution on May 20, 1991, by
approving the establishment of a Compensation Commission 34 to
process claims35 and determine reparation awards for environmental
damages. 6 Finally, on August 15, 1991, the Security Council passed
Resolution 706 which provided that Iraq would be able to export oil
in specified quantities in order to obtain currency to supply food
and medicine to the Iraqi people, as long as thirty percent of the
proceeds were set aside for war reparations to Kuwait and other Gulf
nations .37
31 Id.
32 Id. at para. 18 (setting up fund to pay compensation and commission to
administer fund); SCOR Res. 706, U.N. SCOR, 3004th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
706, at para. 4 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1719 (1991); see Preston Brown, U.N.
Fund to Compensate Claims Against Iraq, INT'L REP. 2 (July 1991) (published by
Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, New York, N.Y.); see also U.S. Trade Mission,
supra note 6, at 377 (citing Green Cross's establishment of prosecution fund to
pursue legal action against Iraq for its "willful" ecological terrorism). Rules of
procedure for the claims process have not yet been created. See United Nations
Establishes Compensation Commission for Iraqi War Damages, MIDDLE E. ExEc-
uTrvE REP., June 1991, at 8.
11 SCOR Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 2982nd mtg. at para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688
(1991).
34 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/22613 (May 20, 1991) (draft).
31 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Security Council
Resolution 687, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/22559 (May 2, 1991) at para. 10 [here-
inafter Secretary-General's Report on Resolution 687].
36 Id. at paras. 25-27.
17 Resolution 706, supra note 32, at paras. 3-4. In order to implement Resolution
706, the Secretary-General determined that thirty percent of the oil revenues would
be used as provision for the Compensation Fund. Report by the Secretary-General
Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 706 (1991), U.N. SCOR,
U.N. Doc. S/23006, at para. 36 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1722, 1724 (1991)
[Vol. 22:151
ECO-TERRORIST ACTS
However, in the Secretary-General's Report on Resolution 706
several problems were identified which would hinder the implemen-
tation of the oil export scheme. First, the Secretary-General noted
that "it would appear that Iraq is most unlikely to be in a position
to offer significant quantities of petroleum products for sale at pres-
ent." 38 Second, even if the Security Council authorized the maximum
amount of $1.6 billion dollars,39 there would still be a shortfall of
$800 million to meet humanitarian needs after the other requirements
of the Resolution, including war reparations, were met.4
However, the Compensation Commission is not the sole source of
recovery. Injured parties may also submit their claims independently
to international or domestic tribunals; 41 in such instances, international
environmental and warfare law will become relevant.42
B. International Environmental Law
1. Conventional Law
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of
the Sea by Oil, the first significant multilateral treaty for the pre-
vention of pollution, was signed on May 12, 1954.41 The purpose of
[hereinafter Secretary-General's Report on Resolution 706]. The Secretary-General
also drafted an elaborate oversight provision which clearly delimited the amount of
Iraqi oil which could be sold abroad and the manner in which the proceeds could
be used. Id. at para. 58. However, Iraq has not agreed to the terms of the U.N.
Resolution, nor has it sold any oil abroad, so there is no money available in the
compensation fund. See John H. Cushman, Environmental Claims for Damage by
Iraq Go Begging for Data, N.Y. TlaEs, Nov. 12, 1991, at C4; see also Nichols,
supra note 12, at A36 (stating Iraq had not agreed to U.N. Resolution); Williams,
supra note 2, at A10 (noting Iraq rejected proposal as violation of its sovereignty).
3' Secretary-General's Report on Resolution 706, supra note 37, at para. 10 (1991).
19 Resolution 706, supra note 32, at para. 1.
40 Secretary-General's Report on Resolution 706, supra note 37, at para. 11.
" Secretary-General's Report on Resolution 687, supra note 35, at para. 22.
42 One significant problem with trying to obtain compensation through individual
claims, according to Richard Golub, publisher of The Oil Pollution Bulletin and an
advocate of collecting damages from Iraq, is that in order for a claim to be successful,
the nation pursuing the claim must have "developed a strategy for assessing the
environmental injuries suffered and then determining the monetary value of those
damages." See Cushman, supra note 37, at C4. Because most nations have contributed
their money and resources to the cleanup effort, rather than to damage assessment,
the data necessary for a successful claim has become increasingly difficult to obtain
due to the passage of time. Id.
41 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,
May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, 327 U.N.T.S. 3. This document was amended in
1962, 1969, and 1971. As of 1987, the agreement had been signed by 73 states; Iraq
is still not a party. Id.; see infra note 44.
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the treaty was to prohibit the discharge of oil into the sea."
In 1972, the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage45 was adopted to give "international
recognition to the need to protect unique aspects of the environment-
both man-made and natural." 46 Article 4 of that Convention stresses
that each State Party to the convention will "do all it can" to protect
and conserve the transmission to future generations of the natural
heritage. 47 Also in 1972, the Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter entered into
force. 48 It protects the oceans, prevents marine pollution, and min-
imizes the likelihood of damage to human life.49
In 1978, Iraq signed the Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-
operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from
Pollution 50 which was designed to prevent marine pollution in the
Persian Gulf.5 Article VI of the Kuwait Convention provides that
Id. Although Iraq was not a signatory to this convention, the Action Plan for
the Development of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Areas of Bahrain,
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates,
appealled to Iraq and other parties to the Action Plan to ratify and implement the
convention. Action Plan for Development of Marine Environment and Coastal Areas,
Apr. 23, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 501 (adopted Apr. 23, 1978) [hereinafter Action Plan].
41 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
Nov. 23, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter World Heritage
Convention].
, Id. at art. 4; see also Schafer, supra note 28, at 290.
4 World Heritage Convention, supra note 45, art. 4, at 41; see Intergovernmental
Working Group on Conservation, Sept. 20, 1971, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/PC.11/
Add.3 (stressing the conservation of natural areas).
41 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter (MARPOL), Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 (entered
into force Aug. 30, 1975) [hereinafter MARPOL]. By 1987, the Convention was in
force for 64 states. See RESTATEMENr (THUD) OF iE FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
TIM UNITED STATES § 601 reporter's notes (Am. Law Inst. 1986) [hereinafter RE-
STATEMENT].
- Id.; see Schafer, supra note 28, at 290. Although Iraq was not a State Party
to this agreement, the Action Plan called upon parties to the Kuwait Convention,
including Iraq, to ratify the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution.
Action Plan, supra note 44, at 509.
" Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Pollution, Apr. 24, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 511 [hereinafter Kuwait
Convention].
11 Id. at art. III, 513. Article III of the Convention provides that "Contracting
States shall ... take all appropriate measures ... to prevent, abate and combat
pollution of the marine environment in the Sea Area." Id. See generally RESTATEMENT,
supra note 48, at 134 (citing Kuwait Convention as example of regional convention);




"Contracting States shall take all appropriate measures to prevent
... pollution caused by discharges from land reaching the Sea
Area ... "52 On April 25, 1978, the parties to the Kuwait Convention
signed the Protocol Concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating
Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emer-
gency." The Protocol provides that "the Contracting States shall co-
operate in taking the necessary and effective measures to protect the
coastline and related interests of one or more of the States from the
threat and effects of pollution due to the presence of oil . . . in the
marine environment resulting from marine emergencies. 5 4
2. Customary Law
In customary law, "a state cannot altogether defeat the formation
of international law by withholding its consent." 5 Many conventions
and treaties that were originally conventional law have become cus-
tomary law through "wide acceptance among the states particularly
involved in the relevent activity. ' 5 6 The principles espoused in such
documents as the Stockholm Declaration of 197211 and the World
Charter for Nature 5 parts of the Law of the Sea Convention of
1982,19 as well as international case law, are probably binding upon
52 Kuwait Convention, supra note 50, at art. VI, 514.
" Protocol Concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil
and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency, April 24, 1978, 17 I.L.M.
526 [hereinafter Protocol].
14 Id. at art. II. The Protocol defines a "marine emergency" as any "incident,
occurrence or situation, however caused, resulting in substantial pollution or imminent
threat of substantial pollution to the marine environment by oil or other harmful
substances." Id. at art. I, para. 2 (emphasis added). The Protocol also provides
that "any Contracting State faced with a marine emergency situation . . . shall (a)
take every appropriate measure to combat pollution and/or to rectify the situa-
tion .... " Id. at art. X.
" Falk, supra note 28, at 42.
16 RESTATEMENT, supra note 48, § 102. However, a principle of customary law
is not binding on a state that declares its opposition to the principle when it is
developed. Id. Nevertheless, a practice initially followed as a matter of courtesy
may become law when the "general and consistent practice of states" causes those
states to believe that they are under a legal obligation to comply with it. Id.
11 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev.l (1973), U.N. Pub. No. E.73.IIA.14
(1974), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
58 World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., 48th
plen. mtg., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/Res/37/7 (1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M.
456 (1983).
19 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122 (1982), U.N. Pub. No. E.83.V.5 (1983), re-
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all states as customary international law because of the almost uni-
versal acceptance of these principles by the international community.
The Stockholm Declaration includes a number of principles which
have the purpose of protecting and enhancing the world's environ-
ment.60 For example, Principle 6 states that "the discharge of toxic
substances or of other substances and the release of heat, in such
quantities or concentrations as to exceed the capacity of the envi-
ronment to render them harmless, must be halted .... ",61 Principle
7 declares that "States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution
of the seas by substances that are liable to create hazards to human
health, to harm living resources and marine life .... ,"62 Principle
21 imposes "responsibility [on member States] to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States .... "63 Finally, Principle 22 provides
that "States shall co-operate to develop further the international law
printed in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter Law of the Sea Convention]. Most of
the provisions regarding the protection of the marine environment reflect customary
international law. RESTATEMENT, supra note 48, § 102. However, those provisions
dealing with settling disputes are conventional law and are, therefore, binding only
on the parties to the agreement. See generally id. (noting that substantive provisions
of the Law of the Sea Convention are customary; dispute settlement provisions are
conventional). Nevertheless, this convention may ultimately become binding on Iraq
because some multilateral agreements become customary law for non-parties who
do not actively dissent. Id. § 102, at 27. The fact that the substantive portions of
the Law of the Sea Convention have already become customary law shows the
international community's acceptance of the major portions of the agreement; it is
not unrealistic to predict that someday this acceptance will encompass the remedial
provisions as well. As of yet, Iraq has not actively dissented to any of the Convention's
provisions.
60 See generally, Schafer, supra note 28, at 291 (noting declaration's purpose to
bolster sea treaties); Sumitra, supra note 29, at 388 (citing Conference on Human
Environment). Another purpose of the Declaration was to create an affirmative duty
on States to avoid causing environmental harm to other States. Schafer, supra note
28, at 292. While the Stockholm Declaration itself is not legally binding, the document
has "received considerable support from states and has guided state practice."
Durwood Zaelke & James Cameron, Global Warming and Climate Change - An
Overview of the International Legal Process, 5 Am. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 249, 264
(1990).
61 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 57, at princ. 6.
62 Id. at princ. 7.
613 Id. at princ. 21 (emphasis added); see Louis B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration
on the Human Environment, 14 HAtv. INT'L L. J. 423, 493 (1973) (stating Principle
21 makes clear that "the rule of responsibility applies ... to any injury inflicted




regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and
other environmental damage .. . 'A
On October 28, 1982, the United Nations General Assembly fol-
lowed up the Stockholm Declaration by passing the World Charter
for Nature, 65 which includes a section on the impact of warfare on
the environment .6 The Charter provides, in pertinent part, that "nat-
ural resources shall not be wasted," '67 and that "[m]ilitary activities
damaging to nature shall be avoided. ' 6 Although the Charter was
adopted by a vote of 111 to one, it was originally intended to be a
guide for regulating the international environment, not to have legally
binding force. 69
Iraq is also a potential party to the Law of the Sea Convention
of 198270 which includes extensive provisions for the protection of
the marine environment against pollution. 7' Although Iraq has signed
6 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 57, at princ. 22; see RESTATEMENT, supra
note 48, § 601, reporter's note 1 (citing Principle 22 as general principle of state
responsibility for environmental injury); see also Gaines, supra note 29, at 311
(noting Principles 21 and 22 create legal obligation to provide reparation or com-
pensation to injured parties); compare Sumitra, supra note 29, at 388 (noting Principle
22 "recognises [sic] the absence of binding rules of international law with regard
to State responsibility for environmental pollution"). Other relevant principles include
Principle 2 ("the natural resources of the earth . . .must be safeguarded for the
benefit of present and future generations") and Principle 5 ("the non-renewable
resources of the earth must be employed in such a way as to guard against the
danger of their future exhaustion .... "). Stockholm Declaration, supra note 57,
at princs. 2 and 5.
65 World Charter for Nature, supra note 58. See generally Schafer, supra note
28, at 293.
Principle 5 of the Charter provides that "[n]ature shall be secured against
degradation caused by warfare or other hostile activities." World Charter for Nature,
supra note 58, at princ. 5.
61 Id. § II, para. 10.
Id. § II, para. 20.
69 SCHOENBAUM & ROSENBERG, supra note 29, at 1071. Nevertheless, such broad
international acceptance of the Charter's provisions is some evidence that its principles
are considered customary law. Moreover, at least one commentator has determined
that the Charter is a source of customary law because the "public conscience"
acknowledges it as a source of law and policy guidance. Falk, supra note 28, at
42.
'0 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 59.
" Id. Article 12 of the agreement comprehensively discusses the protection and
the preservation of the marine environment. The agreement also includes sections
on global and regional cooperation (Section 2); monitoring and environmental as-
sessment (Section 4); international rules and national legislation to prevent, reduce,
and control pollution of the marine environment (Section 5), enforcement (Section
6); safeguards (Section 7); and responsibility and liability (Section 9). For specific
provisions, see infra note 73 and accompanying text.
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the Law of the Sea Convention, it is only a potential party. The
requisite number of states have not yet signed the agreement to make
it legally enforceable. Nevertheless, as a source of customary law,
much of the Law of the Sea Convention is binding on non-signatories
as well. 72 One relevant portion of the agreement is Article 194(1)
which provides that "[s]tates shall take . . . all measures . . . that
are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine
environment from any source .... ,71
Various principles of international case law are also relevant .74 The
most widely cited case establishing state liability for transboundary
pollution is the Trail Smelter case. 71 In Trail Smelter, an international
tribunal held that "no state has the right to use . . . its territory in
such a manner as to cause injury ... to the territory of an-
72 Id.
71 Id. at art. 194. Other relevant portions include Article 194(2) which provides:
States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their
jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution
to other States and their environment, and that pollution arising from
incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread
beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights ....
Id.
Furthermore, Articles 213-32, which are conventional laws, address the enforce-
ment of the Convention's anti-pollution provisions. Article 230 provides that
"[mionetary penalties only may be imposed with respect to violations of national
laws and regulations or applicable international rules and standards . . . ." Id. at
art. 230 (emphasis added). Article 232 provides that "States shall be liable for
damage or loss attributable to them .... ." Id. at art. 232. In addition, Article
235(1) holds states "responsible for the fulfillment of their international obliga-
tions ... [and t]hey shall be liable in accordance with international law." Id. at
art. 235(1). Finally, Article 235(2) "ensure[s] that recourse is available ... for
prompt and adequate compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused by
pollution . . . ." Id. at art. 235(2).
1,Although not all international case law has become customary, the holdings
of international tribunals are "persuasive evidence of what the law is" and should
be "accorded great weight." RESTATEMENT, supra note 48, § 103 cmt. b. Moreover,
the Trail Smelter case and the Corfu Channel case are almost universally considered
customary law. Trail Smelter (Can. v. U.S.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1949); Corfu Channel
(U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9); see Richard E. Levy, International Law and
the Chernobyl Accident: Reflections on an Important but Imperfect System, 36 KAN.
L. Rv. 81, 90, 100-01 (1987) (stating holdings of Trail Smelter & Corfu Channel
express general principles of international law); Zaelke & Cameron, supra note 60,
at 264 (noting principles of Trail Smelter accepted as rule of customary international
law by large number of states).
11 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1949). The Trail Smelter decision involved a Canadian smelter
plant which emitted large amounts of sulfur dioxide that crossed the border into
the State of Washington, causing extensive environmental damage. Id.
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other .... ,,76 However, the tribunal withheld judgment on an in-
junction against causing future damages.77 On the other hand, the
Corfu Channel case considered whether liability could be imposed
on the Albanian government where mines were laid in Albanian
territorial waters causing the explosion of two British warships.7 8 The
International Court, emphasizing the Albanian government's knowl-
edge of the minefield, held that it was "every State's obligation not
to knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to rights
of other States." '79
C. International Warfare Laws
The 1977 Environmental Modification Convention, 0 to which Iraq
is a party,8' makes it unlawful to "engage in military . . . environ-
mental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or
severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any
other State Party.' '82 A facially similar conventional warfare law is
the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 1949.83 Protocol I
prohibits "methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may
76 Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1965; see also Gaines, supra note 29, at 322-23
(noting Trail Smelter established State liability for damage of "serious consequence").
77 Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1934.
718 Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 25.
79 Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 22 (quoted in M. McDOUGAL & W.M. REISMAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 524, 525 (1981)); see Levy,
supra note 74, at 101 (indicating that many scholars extend this principle to the
pollution context).
10 United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333,
[hereinafter ENMOD] 1108 U.N.T.S. 152 (entered into force Oct. 5, 1978), reprinted
in 16 I.L.M. 88.
81 Id.
82 Id. at art. 1.1 (emphasis added). "Environmental modification techniques" are
defined by the Convention as "any technique for changing-through the deliberate
manipulation of natural processes-the dynamics ... of the Earth .... " Id. at
art. II.
83 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I], (entered into force Dec.
7, 1978), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977); see ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF,
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS oF WAR 387 (2d ed. 1989); Schafer, supra note 28, at
310 (explaining Protocol I is significant conventional law, but not universally ac-
cepted). Iraq is not a State Party to Protocol I and, therefore, is not bound to
uphold it. See Protocol I, supra. However, the acceptance of Protocol I by the
majority of States shows that it may soon be considered a source of customary
international law.
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be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to
the natural environment."' The Geneva Convention of 1949 also
contains a provision prohibiting the destruction of property in the
absence of military necessity. 5
Although the Hague Conventions of 189916 and 19077 were pre-
viously sources of conventional law, they were incorporated into
customary international law during the Nuremberg Trials.88 Although
the Hague Convention of 1899 was strictly limited to the prohibition
of poison and materials causing unnecessary suffering,89 the Hague
Convention of 1907, which superseded the earlier agreement, encom-
-' Protocol I, supra note 83, at Art. 35.3, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21 (emphasis added).
Other than the slight language differences between ENMOD and Protocol I, there
are other more significant differences. First, Protocol I addresses any method of
warfare that is intended to cause environmental damage, whereas ENMOD is re-
stricted to environmental modification techniques. See Schafer, supra note 28, at
312. In addition, Protocol I governs relations between warring nations, while ENMOD
controls relations between State Parties to the Convention. Id.
11 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
of 1949] (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950), reprinted in ROBERTS & GUELF, supra
note 83, at 272. Article 53 provides: "any destruction by the Occupying Power of
real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons,
or to the State ... is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely
necessary by military operations." Id. Iraq is a State Party to the Geneva Convention.
Id.
" The relevant text of that document provides: "the occupying State shall only
be regarded as administrator and usufructuary of the ... real property, forests and
agricultural works belonging to the hostile State ... It must protect the capital of
these properties ..... " Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, (HAGUE II), July 29, 1899 [hereinafter Hague Convention of 1899],
reprinted in DIETRICH SCHINDLER & Jnu TOMAN, Tim LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS
63, 91 (1988). A usufructuary is defined in the civil law as "one who has the . . .
right of enjoying anything in which he has no property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1544 (6th ed. 1990).
The Hague Convention of 1907 provides that occupying States have the af-
firmative duty to "safeguard the capital of [the properties enumerated in the Hague
Convention of 18991 and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct."
Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, art. 55 [hereinafter Hague Convention of 1907], reprinted
in Roberts & Guelff, supra note 68, at 43. It also holds that "[t]he right of belligerents
to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." Id. at art. 22.
" In that case, the tribunal held that the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907
had the "force of customary law - binding even on non-signatory states." See
Schafer, supra note 28, at 305 (citing U.N. WAR CRI iS COMM'N, LAW REPORTS
OF TRIALs OF WAR CRna ALs (1949)); see also Falk, supra note 28, at 41 (noting
Hague Conventions binding beyond "orbit of consent").
19 Hague Convention of 1899, supra note 86.
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passed a wider range of activities and was intended to "humanize"
war as much as possible. 9° Another recent addition to customary law
is Protocol II of 1977 on the Protection of Victims of Non-inter-
national Armed Conflict. 91 Protocol II prohibits "destroy[ing], re-
mov[ing] or render[ing] useless objects indispensable to the survival
of the civilian population, such as ...drinking water installations
and supplies and irrigation works . "..."92
D. Future Sources of Environmental Wartime Law
In response to Iraq's environmental devastation of Kuwait and the
Persian Gulf, many experts have called for new laws addressing
environmental wartime law. 93 However, no law on this matter has
yet been implemented.
III. ANALYSIS
The three potential sources for Iraqi liability are United Nations
Security Council Resolution 687, 94 international environmental law,
and international warfare law. 95 Although Resolution 687 is sufficient
to impose legal responsibility, the passage of a United Nations' res-
olution to institute liability is a rare occurrence. More importantly,
in this instance, is the fact that the Compensation Fund designated
by Resolution 687 as a source of recovery for victims of the envi-
ronmental damage, has not received any monies from the sale of
Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 87.
9' Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II] (entered into force in 1978) reprinted
in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977); see, e.g., Waldemar A. Solf, Protection of Civilians
Against the Effects of Hostilities under Customary International Law under Protocol
I, 1 Am. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 117, 133-34 (1986) (citing Protocol II as source of
customary international law).
91 Protocol II, supra note 91, at art. 14.2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615.
91 See Sarah Lee, A Geneva Convention for the Environment, 135 SoLic. J. 386
(1991) (calling for Fifth Geneva Convention for Environment); Nimetz & Caine,
supra note 18, at 8 (stressing need for environmental wartime agreement); William
Walker, Canada Urges 'Eco-terrorism' Law, TORONTO STAR, July 11, 1991, at 13
(urging law prohibiting damage not necessary to achievement of definite military
advantage); see also Falk, supra note 28, at 45 (promoting a proposed Convention
on the Crime of Ecocide); Alan E. Boyle, Marine Pollution under the Law of the
Sea Convention, 79 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 347 (1985) (calling for more
comprehensive marine pollution laws).
94 SCOR Res. 687, supra note 30, at 7.
9' See Schafer, supra note 28, at 287.
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Iraqi oil. 96 Therefore, Resolution 687 to date has only served as a
source of international condemnation and has not fulfilled the original
purpose of compensation.
Moreover, the procedures necessary to assess liability for violations
of international environmental law are generally either absent 97 or
undeveloped. 98 In addition, international environmental law imparts
upon states civil, rather than criminal, liability. 99 Furthermore, in-
ternational warfare law is well developed in some areas, 100 holding
states' rulers criminally responsible for their actions. 1'0 However,
where international warfare law addresses the environment, the pro-
visions are normally ill-defined'0 2 or do not define environmental
destruction as a "war crime." Thus, international tribunals lack the
authority to hold a state or its leader criminally responsible for "war
crimes" against the environment and are left with only an ineffectual
compensatory remedy. Exactly how ineffectual current international
law is on environmental warfare will be discussed below.
On April 3, 1991, the United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 687 which reaffirmed that Iraq is legally responsible for,
96 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
97 See Protocol, supra note 53 (no liability provisions); Stockholm Declaration,
supra note 57 (same); World Charter for Nature, supra note 58 (same).
" See, e.g., Kuwait Convention, supra note 50, at art. XIII ("Contracting States
undertake to co-operate in formulation and adoption of rules and procedures for
the determination of . . . liability and compensation" for environmental damage);
MARPOL, supra note 48, at art. X, 26 U.S.T. at 2411, 1046 U.N.T.S. at 143
(procedures for assessing liability undeveloped).
" Civil liability, by its nature, only contemplates monetary damages. In this case,
the fact that a several billion dollar debt remains for the cost of the Persian Gulf
cleanup clearly evidences that civil liability in this area is insufficient. See, e.g.,
Major Postwar Clean-Up Effort, supra note 24, at 132. Although it is arguable
whether the sale of Iraqi oil could finance the cleanup or compensate the victims
of the damage, see supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text, Hussein's refusal to
comply with U.N. Resolutions authorizing such a sale shows his resistance to accept
responsibility for his actions and illustrates the limitations of civil liability when the
individual responsible for the acts sought to be compensated remains in power. See
supra note 37.
-o See Geneva Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Con-
flicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Protocol I, supra note 83, at arts. 68-79,
1125 U.N.T.S. at 35-40; Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 87, at Annex, art.
XXII.
1o, See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 83, at pt. V, sec. II, art. 85, 1125 U.N.T.S.
at 41 (grave breaches of Protocol I regarded as "war crimes").
-02 See Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 87, at annex, art. XXII; Hague
Convention 1899, supra note 86, at annex, art. XXII.
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inter alia, the environmental damage and the depletion of natural
resources caused by Iraqi forces. 03 Because United Nations Security
Council resolutions have the force of binding law, 1° Resolution 687
has the authority to hold Iraq liable for violating "international law"
in its most general sense. 05 However, the resolution is deficient in
two respects: (1) it does not provide for Hussein's personal culpability;
and (2) it only provides for compensation for short-term environ-
mental damage to the region. 06 Thus, while United Nations Resolution
687 is a potential legal source for holding Iraq responsible, it will
ultimately be insufficient. Without better means of imposing liability
under international law, future "eco-terrorists" will surely escape
liability.
A. International Environmental Law
Current international environmental law is insufficient to compen-
sate the victims of Iraq's environmental attack on the Persian Gulf
region primarily because Iraq is insolvent. Victims attempting to
acquire compensation under the United Nations' fund will have to
wait a long time for Iraq to contribute enough of its oil profits to
compensate all of them, provided that Iraq does, in fact, start con-
tributing to the fund through exportation of its oil. Furthermore,
current law does not provide for personal culpability. However, Iraq
is potentially liable under a number of conventional and customary
103 SCOR Res. 687, supra note 30, at 7.
104 U.N. CHARTER art. 25 & art. 48, para. 4. As a member of the United Nations,
resolutions, declarations and other statements of principles that are passed by the
United Nations Security Council have the effect of law on Iraq. RESTATEMENT, supra
note 48, § 102, reporter's note 3.
103 SCOR Res. 687, supra note 30, at 7.
06 Nimetz & Caine, supra note 18, at 9. The importance of these two deficiencies
can be explained through a pragmatic approach. First, Hussein and individuals like
him, who authorize atrocities such as the Persian Gulf environmental damage, have
already demonstrated an inability to operate within the parameters of the international
legal system, and, it may be assumed, will continue to disregard international law,
while immunizing themselves from international accountability. One indication such
premise is true is Hussein's failure to comply with the U.N. Resolutions authorizing
the sale of Iraqi oil. See supra note 37. Had Hussein been held personally liable
for his actions, he would not be in the position to ignore demands for Iraqi liability.
Second, numerous commentators have stated that the environmental destruction
in the Persian Gulf would last well into the future. See supra text accompanying
note 27. Resolution 687 and similar measures which allow a State to escape full
responsibility for its acts may not constitute a sufficient deterrent to future actors
and, more importantly, will certainly fail to fully compensate the individuals and
States already harmed by the unlawful conduct.
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international environmental law sources: (1) Iraq is a signatory to
the Kuwait Convention; 17 (2) Iraq is a State Party to the Protocol
Concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil;108
(3) Iraq is a potential party to the Law of the Sea Convention of
1982; 109 (4) Iraq is arguably obligated under customary law to uphold
the Stockholm Declaration" and the World Charter for Nature;"'
and (5) Iraq is bound by the principles of customary international
law reflected in the Trail Smelter'12 and Corfu Channel"3 cases.
However, these laws either hold a state responsible for civil damages 1 4
or do not have established procedures to institute liability." 5
,01 The Kuwait Convention creates an affirmative duty on all parties to prevent
pollution. Kuwait Convention, supra note 50, at art. III, para. a. The convention
asked Iraq to adopt the Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea
by Oil, supra note 43, and the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution,
supra note 48. Action Plan, supra note 44, at para. 25. However, as of this date,
Iraq has yet to become a party to either of those conventions and, therefore, is not
bound by them.
,' The Protocol requires the parties to take "necessary and effective measures"
to protect the coastline from oil in the event of a marine emergency. Protocol, supra
note 53, at art. II, para. 1.
,09 Iraq was committed to become a State Party to the Law of the Sea Convention
in 1985. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 59, at art. 305 pt. XVII. However,
as of December 10, 1982, the Convention was lacking 36 of the required 60 signatures
to enter the law into force. Id. Nevertheless, certain portions of the Law of the Sea
Convention are considered customary law and, as such, are binding even on non-
parties. Id.
10 The Stockholm Declaration attempts to impose an obligation on States not to
transform detrimentally the environment. See Sumitra, supra note 29, at 388. Iraq
is specifically guilty of violating Principles 2, 5, 6, 7, 21, and 22 (discussed supra
notes 61-64, 66 and accompanying text).
"I The World Charter for Nature prohibits wasting natural resources and "military
activities damaging to nature." World Charter for Nature, supra note 58, at Annex,
§§ II and III, para. 20.
112 Trail Smelter (Can. v. U.S.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 at 1923 (1949). Trail Smelter
held that nations may not use their territory to the injury of neighboring countries.
Id.
'" Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 at 22 (Apr. 9).
"4 Trail Smelter establishes state liability for environmental damage of "serious
consequence" proven with "clear and convincing" evidence. Id. at 1934. See also
Gaines, supra note 29, at 322-23. However, under Trail Smelter the only available
remedy is monetary compensation for past damages. Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at
1934. The Trail Smelter court expressly denied an injunction against future damages
caused by the plant and, therefore, prevented the State of Washington from protecting
itself against future injury. Id.
" See Kuwait Convention, supra note 50, at art. XIII (liability provisions in
development); Protocol, supra note 53 (no liability provisions); Law of the Sea
Convention, supra note 59, at pt. XI, subsec. H (liability provisions not in force);
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 57 (no liability provisions); World Charter for
Nature, supra note 58 (no liability provisions).
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Applying these laws to the case at hand, it is clear that Iraq has
violated provisions in each of them. Under the Kuwait Convention,
Iraq's intentional release of millions of gallons of oil into the Persian
Gulf would violate Article 111116 which creates an affirmative duty
on state parties to prevent pollution. Moreover, Article II of the
Protocol to the Kuwait Convention provides that the Contracting
Parties, including Iraq, must take "necessary and effective measures"
to protect the coastline from the threat of oil resulting from marine
emergencies.'' 7 Because Article I of the Protocol defines a "marine
emergency" to include "any situation, however caused, [which poses
an] imminent threat ... to the marine environment," the massive
oil spill, even though intentionally caused by Iraq, constitutes a marine
emergency which requires Iraq's affirmative action to protect the
environment. As of this date, Iraq has failed to provide either financial
or technical assistance to the Persian Gulf cleanup efforts and, there-
fore, is in violation of the Protocol.
Iraq has similarly violated the principles of international law re-
flected in the Law of the Sea Convention. For instance, under Article
194(1), Iraq is required to take all measures that are necessary to
prevent and control pollution that would adversely affect the marine
environment."' Again, Iraq intentionally caused the pollution of the
Persian Gulf and has failed to take any measures to alleviate the
situation. In addition, Article 194(2) contains a sweeping provision
which creates an affirmative duty on states to "ensure that activities
under .. .their control are so conducted as not to cause damage by
pollution to other States and their environment, and that pollution
arising from incidents ... under their ... control does not spread
beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights."' 1 9 Iraq ar-
guably "controlled" Kuwait while massive quantities of oil were being
pumped into the Persian Gulf because United Nations forces had not
yet ousted them from Kuwaiti territory. 20 On the other hand, Iraq
See discussion supra note 51.
"' See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
I See supra text accompanying note 73.
119 See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 73.
110 See Wicker, supra note 5, at 21; see also Millions of Gallons, supra note 3,
at 37 (noting that Iraq released oil to prevent an allied invasion of Kuwait). Because
the Law of the Sea Convention only contemplates damage to the marine environment,
Iraq's questionable control over Kuwait while the oil well fires were lit and the oil
lakes were being formed is not at issue. See, e.g., Wicker, supra note 5, at 21
(noting oil well fires set by Iraqi forces).
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clearly did not ensure that "activities under their control" prevented
pollution, but, in fact, affirmatively caused the pollution.' 2' Moreover,
the Persian Gulf pollution has been quoted as destroying marine life
along the Saudi Arabian shoreline and part of the Iranian coast.
Therefore, pollution caused by an activity under Iraq's control "spread
beyond" an area where Iraq exercised "sovereign rights"' 22 in vio-
lation of the Convention.
Iraq has also breached its international obligations under the Stock-
holm Declaration and the World Charter for Nature. For example,
under Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, Iraq has breached
its duty "to ensure that activities within their ... control do not
cause damage to the environment of other States.' ' 23 Because the
effects of the oil well fires and oil well spills were felt in Saudi
Arabia, Iran,' u Pakistan, Turkey, and Bulgaria,'25 Iraq's actions have
clearly caused environmental damage to other States. In addition,
Iraq violated sections II and III of the World Charter for Nature
by wasting enormous quantities of irreplaceable natural resources 26
and destroying the environment without military justification, 27 re-
spectively.
Finally, the Trail Smelter holding would be relevant in this case,
despite the fact that Kuwait was not legally Iraq's territory. 'U The
inferred policy of the case is to hold states liable for ecological
damages in areas that are within their control, 129 provided that two
elements are met: (1) the environmental damage must be of "serious
consequence" and (2) the damage must be proven by "clear and
convincing evidence.' ' 30 In this case, it is undisputed that the envi-
ronmental effects on the Persian Gulf region are disastrous. 31 More-
over, the evidence is "clear and convincing" that the environmental
121 See, e.g., Millions of Gallons, supra note 3, at 37.
122 See Nakhoul, supra note 11.
23 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 57, at 4.
124 See Nakhoul, supra note 11.
'5 See Abu-Nasr, supra note 20, at G04.
126 World Charter for Nature, supra note 58, § II, para. 10.
127 Id. § III, para. 20.
128 Because Iraq claimed that Kuwait was "its territory," although legally it was
not, the holding is probably applicable.
129 The Trail Smelter case held that "no state has the right to use ... its territory
in such a manner as to cause injury ... to the territory of another ." 3 R.I.A.A.
at 1965.
130 Id.
131 See, e.g., Nimetz & Caine, supra note 18, at 8.
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damage inflicted on the region was a direct result of Hussein's actions
and that, as a result of those actions, cleanup expenses will eventually
total over several billion dollars. 132
Although Iraq has breached accepted principles of customary in-
ternational law and violated provisions in each of these Conventions,
it is fiscally unable to assist in the cleanup effort, because now, as
before the war, it is in serious financial debt.1 3 As a result of Iraq's
insolvency, the United States and its allies now have a debt of several
billion dollars for the clean up of the Gulf region.3 4 Moreover,
assuming that Iraq was able to make financial reparations to Kuwait
and other Persian Gulf nations for its actions and could be compelled
to do so, the potential for future environmental devastation would
still exist. Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader responsible for ordering
the destruction, has not been held personally accountable and remains
in power. 3 Thus, the insufficiency of civil damages as reparation
for wartime environmental crimes, particularly in regard to this case,
is indisputable.
B. International Warfare Law
Although Iraq is bound by the Convention on the Prohibition of
Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques (ENMOD); the Geneva Convention of 1949, Protocol II;
and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the application of the
environmental warfare sections contained in those agreements to Iraq's
actions is unclear.
First, in order for state actions to fall under ENMOD, the action
in question must meet two criteria. The activity must be designated
as an "environmental modification technique'' 136 and must result in
"widespread, long-lasting or severe effects.' '13 Beginning with the
second element, the environmental devastation in the Persian Gulf
is expected to have a serious impact on the region for as long as
3I See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
133Major Postwar Clean-up Effort, supra note 24, at 133. It is highly probable
that other nations resorting to ecological warfare will likewise be unable to bear the
cost of their actions.
134 See id. at 132.
'I At least two commentators have urged that if the world community believes
environmental warfare acts, such as Hussein's, are "truly outrageous" they should
be punishable as war crimes. Nimetz & Caine, supra note 18, at 10.
116 ENMOD, supra note 80, at art. I, 31 U.S.T. at 336, 1108 U.N.T.S. at 153.
13" Id.
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twenty years. 3 ' Thus, the second element is met. However, in order
for an activity to qualify as an "environmental modification tech-
nique," the offending nation must have "deliberately" manipulated
the Earth's natural processes. 139 In this case, early predictions of
"global warming" or a "nuclear winter" were inaccurate. 14  More-
over, there is no evidence suggesting that Hussein intended to alter
the world's temperature by igniting Kuwaiti oil wells. In fact, the
threshold for liability under ENMOD appears to be higher than the
facts of the present case suggest. 41 Thus, the first element of ENMOD
is not met. Therefore, since Iraq did not intend to modify the en-
vironment, it probably did not violate the ENMOD.
The Geneva Convention of 1949 is another potential source of
Iraqi liability'42 for its environmental offenses. The Geneva Conven-
tion prohibits the destruction of state property, "except where such
destruction is absolutely necessary for military operations."'' 43 In this
case, Iraq clearly destroyed Kuwaiti property by igniting hundreds
of its oil wells. 44 Moreover, the oil wells were torched as Iraq retreated
from Kuwait; thus, there was no "absolutely necessary" military
justification for that measure. 145 However, the most commonly as-
serted reason for the oil release is that Hussein wanted to prevent
an allied invasion of Kuwait from the Persian Gulf.' 46 The Geneva
Convention is probably inapplicable to the oil spill since the threshold
for its implementation is extremely high.' 47 Thus, Iraq could probably
3I See Major Postwar Clean-up Effort, supra note 24, at 134.
119 ENMOD, supra note 80, at art. II, 31 U.S.T. at 336, 1108 U.N.T.S. at 153.
,,0 See, e.g., Lobsenz, supra note 19 (saying smoke from Kuwaiti oil fires unlikely
to affect world climate).
'1' ENMOD was implemented in response to the United States' attempt to direct
and manipulate rainfall during the Vietnam War. ROBERTS & GELFF, supra note
83, at 377. Although it is readily apparent that Hussein deliberately intended to
adversely affect the environment, there is no evidence that he deliberately manipulated
the Earth's processes.
142 Iraq is not bound by Protocol I because it is not a signatory to that convention.
Protocol I, supra note 83.
,41 Geneva Convention of 1949, supra note 85, at art. 53, 6 U.S.T. at 3552, 75
U.N.T.S. at 322.
- See, e.g., Wicker, supra note 5, at 21.
145 Id.
,,6 See, e.g., Millions of Gallons, supra note 3, at 37.
147 Although the Geneva Convention contains provisions prohibiting the "extensive
destruction" of the environment and permits individuals ordering such destruction
to be put on trial, the threshold at which environmental destruction is prohibited
is extremely high. See Lee, supra note 93, at 386; see also Falk, supra note 28, at
37 (noting that only "wanton destruction" of natural resources creates a basis for
legal accountability and that, in the next war, the state could "reaffirm claims of
unconstitutional national security interests" as a defense to international culpability).
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escape liability under the Geneva Convention either because of a
vaguely defined exception to the rule or because Iraq's actions failed
to meet the threshold for implementation of the Geneva Convention.
The Hague Convention of 1907 is also ineffective. Its provisions
which contemplate wartime environmental issues are extremely broad
and fail to define what behavior is prohibited. 4 For this reason,
Hussein's actions would likely not be covered by the Convention's
language. Thus, holding Iraq liable for its extensive environmental
atrocities under the Hague Convention is unrealistic.
Finally, Protocol II probably applies to this case because it prohibits
"destroying" or "rendering useless . . . drinking water installations
and supplies" during wartime. 49 It is unclear from the language of
the treaty, however, whether attempting to destroy water supplies or
doing an act which could result in the destruction of water supplies
would be sufficient to invoke the application of Protocol II. Iraq
was unable to destroy Saudi desalination plants, but the spilling of
massive quantities of oil into the Gulf nearly had that effect. Although
Protocol II is potentially applicable in this case, the language of the
treaty makes it critically insufficient to hold Iraq or other eco-terrorists
fully responsible.
IV. CONCLUSION
United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 is the first inter-
national effort to hold Iraq liable for its wartime offenses. Iraq
should be held responsible for the numerous atrocities it committed
during the Persian Gulf War, including its deliberate destruction of
the environment. While Resolution 687 may ultimately provide a
mechanism for recovery in this case, the other legal weapons which
could be used against Iraq for this "environmental terrorism" and
future acts of "environmental terrorism" are critically deficient.
Traditional environmental law remedies are deficient because Iraq
is financially unable to compensate the enormous number of claims
which could arise from individuals affected by its actions. Moreover,
Iraq's insolvency guarantees that it will be powerless to financially
assist the cleanup of the Persian Gulf region, fully compensate for
environmental destruction, or quickly compensate the human victims
of the environmental damage. Iraq will probably avoid liability under
, Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 87, at art. 55.
149 Protocol II, supra note 91, at art. 14, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615.
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international warfare law as well. The few provisions addressing the
environment are too broad to be enforceable or are limited to a
particular form of environmental warfare activity.
The crisis in the Gulf has pointed out serious deficiencies in the
current legal mechanisms for combatting international environmental
terrorism. Ironically, the most promising development to emerge from
this crisis is the realization that international law is insufficient to
prevent incidents like this from occurring or to adequately compensate
victims. A new Geneva Convention on environmental warfare should
be implemented so that environmental provisions encompass a wide
variety of military activities, eliminate the "exceptions" or else define
them narrowly, and hold the individuals who ordered the destruction
personally responsible as war criminals.
Laura Edgerton
